Taiwan Strait Military Balance

James Luk
Project Assistant, SCRAP Weapons
Hugo Bainbridge
graphic designer, SCRAP Weapons
According to the World Military Expenditure report, China’s military expenditure increased by 4.2% to reach $292 billion in 2022. But how do China’s military capabilities compare to the United States along the Taiwan Strait? This article examines China’s conventional missile capabilities in comparison with the United States and its allies to argue that diplomacy, arms control, and disarmament are necessary to avoid conflict surrounding Taiwan, not the proliferation of missiles.
In the event of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait, China’s strategy is to deny U.S. forces access to Taiwan and areas surrounding the island using a combination of missiles, cyber warfare, and space capabilities. Due to Mainland China’s geographical proximity to Taiwan, China’s area denial strategy does not depend on long-range or high-yield missile systems, but rather a smaller number of targeted, accurate and strategically placed missiles such as the DF-17 and DF-21D missile systems. The China Nuclear Weapons 2023 report published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists shows that two[1] out of twenty-two brigades in the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) Eastern and Southern Theatre Commands operate the DF-17 medium-range hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) missiles. This has caused alarm in Washington D.C. due to the missile’s ability to counter existing ballistic missile defence systems to strike U.S. military bases in the region. Another weapon system of note is the DF-21D, the first anti-ship ballistic missile developed to counter U.S. aircraft carriers, which is operated by one brigade[2] in the entire Eastern and Southern Theatre Command. Both missiles are categorised as medium-range ballistic missiles, and although there is no specific estimate of DF-17 and DF-21 stockpiles, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated the PLARF to possess 500 medium-range ballistic missiles in 2022.

While this number is certainly alarming to Taiwan, Chinese missile capabilities pale in comparison to the inventory of the U.S.’ 5,000 JASSM and 4,000 Tomahawk missiles detailed in the previous Taiwan Strait Military Balance article that has the capability to strike 94% of the Chinese population. U.S. concern about Chinese hypersonic glide missile technology, and the broader concern of Chinese military technology catching up to the US, must be put into the context of the U.S. and China’s missile stockpile gap. The U.S. Department of Defense 2022 China Military Power Report estimates China’s Rocket Force possesses 300 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), 600 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM), and 500 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM). These estimates add up to 1,400 ballistic and cruise missiles that can be deployed during a potential conflict surrounding Taiwan. To put the stockpile gap into perspective, the U.S.’ 9,000 combined JASSM and Tomahawk missiles outnumber the PLARF’s estimated ballistic and cruise missile stockpile for conflict surrounding Taiwan by over six times, and the entire PLARF’s missile stockpile of 1,650 missiles by over fives times.[3]

Despite the existing quantitative gulf, the U.S. and its allies continue to compete with China to increase spending on offensive missile capabilities. Japan purchased 400 Tomahawk missiles and Australia purchased 220 Tomahawk missiles from the U.S. in 2023. A future where the proliferation of offensive capabilities are pursued over risk reduction through diplomacy, arms control, and disarmament agreements can only lead to conflict, which is disastrous for those living in Taiwan and surrounding the Strait. A United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) is necessary, now more than ever, as noted in António Guterres’s New Agenda for Peace, for reasonable measures to be pursued to control accelerating tensions and prevent conflict around Taiwan.
[1] Base 61, 614 Brigade in Yongan (26.0596, 117.3151) and Base 62, 627 Brigade in Puning (23.4122, 116.1816).
[2] Base 62, 624 Brigade in Danzhou (19.4721, 109.4570).
[3] This estimate includes dual-capable missiles and some medium range nuclear missiles as there is no breakdown of conventional medium range ballistic missiles in the 2022 China Military Power Report, see Appendix 1.

James Luk
Project Assistant, SCRAP Weapons
Hugo Bainbridge
graphic designer, SCRAP Weapons