This article was originally published by India’s World

A Euro-bomb or a German nuclear bomb. Or a German-French bomb, or a German-French- British bomb, the corridors of European chancelleries are buzzing with officials dusting off Cold War files for non-American nuclear options in response to uncertainty over President Donald Trump’s apparent preference for Russia over NATO. Without the supposed deterring effect of US nuclear weapons, how can Europe stand up to Russian nuclear threats? Many convinced Atlanticists now thank France’s General de Gaulle for creating a bomb that can wreak havoc in ‘toute directions’ outside of the American nuclear ‘umbrella’.

In reality, President Vladimir Putin has neither been able to use his nuclear arsenal to intimidate Ukraine, nor deter Kyiv from attacking Moscow, invading Russian territory and destroying nuclear warning radars and strategic air force bomber bases. The radiation from a Russian nuclear attack would harm Russians and destroy its reputation across the world. Nor would even the incineration of the people of Kyiv guarantee victory.

Palpable fears

Nevertheless, the fear of nuclear war haunts the public mind with Russia’s coded threats and the risks of escalation. US policy makers, perhaps pleased that their policy of squeezing Russia has produced such an ill-considered invasion, were then concerned that enabling Ukraine to defeat Russia on the battlefield would turn into nuclear war or precipitate the collapse of Russia into a vast failed state – or both.

In raising the issue of some form of shared nuclear force, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s own experience in the German army as a conscript in the 1970s makes him uniquely informed amongst today’s leaders about the self-destructive realities of nuclear war should deterrence fail. As an artilleryman in the Bundeswehr, his unit would have been likely equipped with artillery guns supplied with US-controlled nuclear artillery shells with an explosive power up to that of the weapons used on Japan in 1945. Thousands of these nuclear shells were built in the US, – shipped to Europe and stashed in bunkers in Germany. That NATO regarded it as rational, even essential to its strategy, to have weapons that would inevitably have destroyed Germans and Germany was and is sobering to for any loose talk of Eurobombs.

Nevertheless, the current nightmare for European publics is that, caught between an aggressive and unstable leaders in both Washington and Moscow, they feel a need for their own nuclear threat to pose to adversaries. The technological and political options for Europe may be summarised in this way:

While Germany has the resources to produce nuclear weapons, even an emergency programme would not be easy, while multinational cooperation is often slow, in contrast to political statements which are easier.

Whatever the military option, there also is a need to resurrect arms control and disarmament, with a return to verified global missile elimination as practiced in the Reagan-Gorbachev era. President Trump recommends nuclear elimination and deep cuts in spending. It is time to ask him to walk the walk as well as talk. Weapons controls are workable in a world where open sources make verification a far easier proposition than it was in the last century.  UN member states should immediately back a new series of special sessions of the General Assembly on Disarmament to produce a robust system for global weapons governance – eliminating WMD and regulating all other forms of weapons. As the world spirals into a new economic depression, this need is greater than ever.

Although the public have the ingrained impression that Russia has vast forces and the EU few — in.  In fact, the Europeans have many more combat aircraft, armoured vehicles and warships than Russia. Public education on this point can support the idea that the EU can negotiate from strength.

French approaches

For France to declare that it will treat a nuclear attack on Warsaw, Berlin or Riga as if it were an attack on Paris – the so-called extended deterrence as provided by the US and UK through NATO – is anathema to 60 years of French strategy. French policy is that nuclear weapons are only about a second strike in retaliation for attacks on France itself, with the option of a “final warning” nuclear strike. But if France does opt to defend all of Europe with its own nuclear threat, technical and political issues come to the fore.

The current nightmare for some Europeans is that, caught between aggressive and unstable leaders in both Washington and Moscow, they feel a need for their own nuclear threat to pose to adversaries.

Some form of French-German technical collaboration might emerge with Germany, but would such a bilateral arrangement not make Poland, or Sweden or the Netherlands feel left out?  Perhaps a joint Eurofunding and staffing mechanism for French nuclear forces might emerge, but the personnel and security issues would be nightmarish.

And what of the British?  Commentators talk up the ideas of a new British ‘tactical’ nuclear bomb – presumably to be carried on air force planes. For 60 years, the UK bomb has been built with US assistance under the US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement. This assistance includes nuclear warhead factory management, design and components, fuses and fire control systems and the missiles that carry them.

Under the terms of this agreement, the UK cannot transfer its US-sourced
technology to a third party without US approval – and that defeats the object.  At this point, can the British point to any nuclear weapon it has or could make and claim that it is British alone? I doubt it, even the old RAF bomb- the WE-177 – was itself derivative of a US weapon.

And what of proliferation? For years, the official five nuclear weapon states – China, France, Russia, the UK and US have denounced other states’ efforts to acquire them, rather like confirmed alcoholics denouncing teenage drinking. Despite their efforts, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel have built their bombs, and Iran may be set on the same course of action.  A Eurobomb would further point to the double standards of the powerful. But perhaps most importantly, the concern of the advocates of nuclear deterrence to prevent others from getting nuclear weapons points to the delusion of deterrence. If nuclear arms are so beneficial, then why bother preventing their spread? Because, of course, the fear is that accidents happen and luck will run out, which is why global weapons governance is at root a realist necessity, not a liberal utopian aspiration. A long historical lens makes the point. Can anyone seriously believe that if India had had Tippoo Sultan and Wellington both had nuclear weapons, no war would have occurred then and forever?

The looming fear of nuclear war with Russia is pressing on European opinion, with US support to the continent now uncertain. Any political-technical response from Europe must be accompanied by robust and global arms control and disarmament as detailed in the project on the Strategic Concept for the Removal of Arms and Proliferation http://www.scrapweapons.com.  A nuclear arms race is a race into a brick wall, for all humanity.